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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BECO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
PlaintiffIAppellant, 
v. 
J-U-B ENGINEERS, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
DefendantIRespondent. 
Supreme Court No. 35873-2008 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BFUEF 
--*^ --" -̂- 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County. 
Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge, presiding. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant. 
C. Tom Arlcoosh, Esq., residing at Gooding, Idaho, for Respondent, 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
J-U-B'S RESPONDING BRIEF NEVER ADDRESSES THE CENTRAL ISSUE THAT 
THE COURT AWARDED MORE IN ATTORNEY'S FEES THAN IS EVEN 
MATHEMATICALLY POSSIBLE. 
J-U-B does not dispute that as of August 15,2005, J-U-B incurred $33,661.92 in 
attorney's fees. This is simply a matter of mathematical calculation. This Court has held 
that J-U-B can recover attorney's fees only for defending BECO's contract claim that 
BECO withdrew on August 15,2005. Thus, the district court cannot award more than 
$33,661.92 in attorney's fees because $33,661.92 is the total amount of attorney's fees 
incurred through August 15,2005. Nowhere in its responding brief on appeal does J-U-B 
address how the district court did not abuse its discretion awarding $35,600 in attorney's 
fees when the district court could award no more than $33,661.92 because even J-U-B 
cannot fashion a reasonable argument that supports the district court's exercise of 
discretion. 
Moreover, common sense dictates that the actual amount of attorney's fees 
attributable to defending only against the contract claim must be less than $33,661.92, not 
$1,938.98 greater than $33,661.92. BECO alleged claims against J-U-B for breach of 
contract, negligence, and intentional interference with contract. J-U-B's answer and 
motion for suminary judgment filed before August 15,2005 addressed all three claims, 
not just the contract claim. Thus, not all the $33,661.92 can be aitributed solely to the 
contract claim. In other words, the attorney's fees attributable only to the contract claim 
must necessarily be less than $33,661.92. J-U-B also fails to address this issue in its 
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responding brief on appeal similarly because even J-U-B cannot fashion a reasonable 
argument that supports the district court's exercise of discretion. 
11. 
J-LI-B REI.IES ON I . \ I l 'ER%IISS~~~<VID1;_NCII  TO SUPPORI 
'1'1-1E I > I S m T  C0L'R'I"S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION. 
J-U-B argues that the court reconsidered the testimony of J-U-B's expert witness, 
Mr. John Bailey, an attorney from Pocatello, Idaho. J-U-B argues that the court relied on 
Mr. Bailey's testimony to establish (1) the reasonableness of the work done; (2) the 
reasonableness of the rate charged; (3) his opinion that BECO's complaint was not well 
researched; and (4) his opinion that litigation against BECO is difficult and unreasonably 
time consuming. However, the law is well established that expert testimony is not 
admissible unless it assists the finder of fact. I.R.E. 702. If testimony is within the 
common experience of the finder of fact, then expert testimony is not admissible. State v. 
Vauie, 135 Idaho 848 (2001.) 
Here, the finder of fact on the attorney's fees issue is the court. J-U-B cannot 
argue that Mr. Bailey's testimony on the reasonableness of the work done, the 
reasonableness of the rate charged, and the sufficiency of the research for the complaint 
were matters to assist the trial court or beyond the common experience of the trial court. 
The trial court is the expert that decides these kinds of issues all the time as a matter of 
law. Moreover, testimony that litigation with any particular party is "difficult and 
unreasonably time consuming" is also not the proper subject of expert testimony because 
it does not involve technical, scientific, or specialized knowledge that will assist the trier 
of fact. Thus, the district court relied on "evidence" that was not appropriate for 
determining the amount of attorney's fees to award against BECO. 
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J-U-B'S "RIGHT RESULTJWRONG REASON 
ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED. 
J-U-B argues that this Court could uphold the district court's award of attorney's 
fees by applying the "right resulthong reason" test. In other words, J-U-B argues that 
the district court could have reached the $35,600 attorney's fees award "if the district 
court had held that BECO's unjustifiable claims were made and pursued frivolousiy."' 
However, this argument flies in the face of the fact that the district court specifically held 
JUB was not entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. $12-121 since BECO's claims were not 
pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.' Because J-U-B has never 
cross-appealed this finding, J-U-B cannot now challenge it or argue "what might have 
been" as an alternate basis for upholding the district court's $35,600 attorney fee award. 
IV . 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PAYING 
J-U-B BECO'S CASH DEPOSIT ON APPEAL. 
J-U-B and the district court rely on I.R.C.P. 79(e) entitled "reclaiming exhibits, 
documents or property" after trial as the law that authorized the district court to take 
BECO's $41,140 cash bond on appeal and pay it over to J-U-B pending appeal. 
However, a basic tenant of statutory construction is that a more specific statute 
addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general. Mulder v. Liberty 
Northwesf Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52 (2000.) Here, I.A.R. 13(b)(15) specifically addresses 
the district court's duty with respect to a cash deposit after the appellate court has vacated 
any money judgment and remanded only for a determination of the amount of the 
' See Respondent's Brief, p. 1 1 ,  
RVo1. IV, p. 813. 
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judgment. Thus, I.A.R. 13(b)(15) is specific to cash bonds and controls over a general 
rule regarding "reclaiming exhibits, documents or property." Under this rule, the district 
court was supposed to modify the cash deposit by lowering it to 136% of the $41,140 
judgment amount for attorney's fees rather than paying J-U-B $41,140 from the cash 
deposit. Accordingly, this Court should order on remand that J-U-B immediately pay 
$41,140 to the Clerk of the Court pending further proceedings on remand. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in BECO's Opening Brief, this Court 
should grant BECO the relief set forth in the BECO's Opening Brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2009. 
Attorneys ~ ~ ~ " B E C O  Construction 
Company, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of November, 2009,I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served, by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
[ & MAIL C. Tom Arkoosh, Esq. 
[ 1 FAX Daniel A. Nevala 
[ ] Overnight Delivery CAPITOL LAW GROUP, PLLC 
[ ] Hand Delivery 301 Main Street 
P. 0. Box 32 
Gooding, Idaho 83330-0032 
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